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Abstract: This paper uses the 1990-1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) panel
data set to show that foreign establishments in Britain pay 13 per cent higher wages than




o foreign establishments pay higher wages than domestic establishments
and does this still apply after accounting for the skill structure and use of
technology? We test these hypotheses using the Workplace Employee Rela-
tions Survey (WERS, see Department of Trade and Industry, 1999, and
Millward  et al., 2000) panel over 1990-1998, containing information on
ownership, skill-structure as well as the use of microelectronic technology for
British manufacturing and services establishments. The combination of these
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09. Te Velde article  25/6/02  3:08 pm  Page 101characteristics in WERS is unique for UK-based data sets. For instance, both
the ABI Respondents Database and the OneSource database cannot be used
for the present analysis in this chapter. Relevant previous studies using
WERS include Blanchflower (1984) and Driffield (1995). Millward et al. (2000)
provide an overview of the developments of the WERS survey since 1980. Te
Velde (2001) discusses the relationship between foreign ownership and the
adoption of technology and skill structure of establishments using WERS.
II FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND WAGES: THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT
Multinationals must possess firm-specific assets that allow them to bear
the costs of setting-up a plant in a foreign location (Dunning, 1993). Firms are
assumed to be able to exploit the firm-specific asset only by foreign direct
investment and not by exports. At the set-up of the foreign affiliate, the firm-
specific asset is usually embodied in a one-shot innovation of technique or
product, leading firms to internalise the advantage rather than licence other
firms. 
The firm-specific asset would lead to the use of superior technology and
hence the use of a higher quality skill-mix and higher average pay. There is a
large literature on determinants of average pay in establishments (see e.g.
Millward et al., 2000, Chapter 6). This paper focuses specifically on whether
foreign-owned establishments pay higher wages than domestically owned
establishments, after allowing for size, union membership, industry, tech-
nology and the skill structure.
The size of establishments is usually found to be an important deter-
minant of average pay. Large firms pay more for observationally equivalent
workers than small firms (Polachek and Siebert, 1993). The arms length
relationship between management and workers prevents managers accurately
assessing worker performance, so that it becomes optimal to the firm to pay a
higher (efficiency) wage to raise the efforts of workers. We should also control
for unionisation. A large literature suggest that unions can raise the pay of
workers (Millward et al., 2000).1 We include industry dummies as large and
persistent wage differentials are present across industries (Krueger and
Summers, 1988), and multinationals usually locate in higher value-added
industries (Davies and Lyons, 1991).
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1 We focus on the effects of unionisation rates, not union strength.
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ESTABLISHMENTS; RECENT EVIDENCE
Various studies have examined the effects of foreign ownership in the UK.
Oulton (1998) used surviving plants in the ARD over 1973-1993. He shows
that foreign-owned establishments have higher value-added per worker. For
non-US foreign-owned establishments, the difference is not significant after
controlling for the higher levels of physical and human capital. However US
foreign-owned establishments have an additional advantage, over and above
higher levels of physical and human capital. Oulton argues that this is due to
superior management or better process technology and products.
Griffith (1999) uses the ARD to investigate the effects of foreign ownership
in the UK motor vehicle and parts industry. She finds that foreign-owned
establishments (especially German owned) hire workers with higher pro-
ductivity levels and pay them correspondingly more. Alternatively, as Griffith
argues, foreign-owned establishments pay their workers more and thus get
more out of them: the efficiency wage hypothesis. Another finding is that
foreign-owned firms operate at a point along the same technology frontier as
domestically-owned establishments, but using more capital inputs; total factor
productivity differences are small and sometimes insignificant, depending on
specifications used. 
Girma et al. (2000) use a firm-level panel data set, OneSource, of almost
4,000 UK manufacturing firms for 1991-1996. They find that foreign firms pay
5 per cent higher wages after allowing for industry, size and productivity
effects, with the American firms having the largest differential and the
Japanese the smallest. However, they can only speculate on the reason, as
their database does not contain information on the skill-structure. 
Forth and Millward (2001) find that foreign-owned establishments pay 
9 per cent more on average than UK owned firms, controlling for a host of
other variables. They use the WERS employee cross-section data set for 1998,
whilst this paper tests whether and why foreign establishments pay their
workers higher wages using the 1990-1998 employers panel survey.2
IV DATA
The Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) is a series of four
national surveys of workplaces, 1980, 1984, 1990 and 1998, containing the
nature of employment relations at work. WIRS is regarded as the
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across the economy (Cully and Marginson, 1995). In 1998, WIRS changed to
WERS, the Workplace Employee Relations Survey. The 1998 WERS panel
survey re-interviewed a random selection of workplaces that responded to the
cross-section WIRS survey of 1990.3 With a response rate of 82 per cent this
yielded 846 continuing workplaces with 25 or more employees between 1990-
1998 (Millward et al., 2000). 
In the survey, foreign ownership involves at least 50 per cent of the control
or ownership of an establishment. There is information in the location of the
headquarters if an establishment is not UK owned: US/Canada, EU country,
elsewhere in Europe (outside EU), or elsewhere in the world. There are eight
different skill groups. Within manual workers, we distinguish between
unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled manual workers. Within non-manual
workers we distinguish between clerical/administrative/secretarial workers;
supervisors and foremen; junior technical and professional workers; senior
technical and professional workers; and middle and senior managers. The
percentage of workers belonging to unions, the unionisation rate, is used to
measure labour market institutions potentially affecting pay. The technology
measure is the sum (up to 11) of micro-electronic technologies in use.
The 1990-1998 panel survey reports on 846 establishments from a survey
of 2000+ in 1990 that survived in 1998. Of the 846 establishments, 580 are
private, of which we can identify 560 with respect to ownership in both years.
Within the sample, foreign ownership has become more important over time.
At the 1990 interview there were 98 foreign-owned establishments (FOE) by
1998 this number has increased to 137. Even so, there is more going on than
these numbers suggest: 57 became foreign owned over 1990-1998, 18 became
domestically owned (DOE). 80 continued to be foreign owned, and 405
continued to be domestically owned. 
V EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We are interested in the effects of foreign ownership, parameter β, in the
following equation
yi = α + β FOR + γ'Zi + εi (1)
where i = establishment i = 1,…,487;4 Zi is a K × 1 vector of controls; FOR is
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3 The sample for the 1990 survey was taken from the Census of Employment in 1987. The
sampling universe comprises all workplaces in Britain with more than 25 employees, except in
agriculture, forestry and fishing.
4 The number of establishments for which we have data on all variables.
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for establishment i) and γ is a K × 1 vector of parameters and εi an error term.
We  use sample weights in estimation5 (this is now common in analyses of
WERS; see Purdon and Pickering, 2001, on sample weights), and hence do not
report econometric specification tests. 
We focus on the panel survey for 1990-1998, by examining the effects on
pay of foreign ownership, size, industry, unionisation rate, skill groups and
technology adoption. Table 1 provides a summary table of the use of computing
facilities and the share of non-manual workers in establishments by
ownership structure for the whole economy. Foreign-owned establishments
use more computing facilities and employ more non-manual workers than
domestic establishments.
Table 1: Computing Facilities and Skill-Structure in Private British
Establishments (1998)
Computing  Share of Non-
Facilities Manual Workers
All establishments 3.73 0.48
Continuing domestic establishments  3.67 0.45
Establishments becoming foreign owned 3.81 0.68
Establishments becoming domestic owned 3.12 0.50
Continuing foreign establishments 4.51 0.57
Foreign owned in 1998  4.17 0.63
WERS 1990-1998 panel survey; using sample weights supplied by WERS panel
survey. 
Table 2 presents the estimation results. The dependent variable is the log
of the gross average pay for full-time workers in 1998. In the first column, we
find that FOEs pay on average 13 per cent more than DOEs. This pay differen-
tial is significant for continuing FOEs, but not for establishments that have
become foreign owned over 1990-1998 (column 2). The biggest pay differential
(18 per cent) arises for establishments with headquarters in the US/Canada
(column 3), consistent with previous evidence. 
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5 The WERS sample is stratified in that workplaces of different size and in different industries
have different probabilities of being selected into the final sample. The probabilities are known
and in estimation we use the (approximately) inverse of these probabilities as weights, thus
obtaining results that are representative of the economy as a whole. Since we use the panel
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Table 2: Foreign Ownership and Average Pay in Private British Establish-
ments (1998)
Log (pay) Log (pay) Log (pay) Log (pay) Log (pay)
Foreign 0.13 0.16 0.033
(2.02)* (2.40)* (0.61)
Continuing foreign  0.19 
establishments (2.30)*
Establishments becoming  0.67 
foreign owned (0.83)




EU FOEs 0.12 
(1.05)
Europe (not-EU) FOEs 0.07 
(0.41)
Other foreign FOEs 0.12 
(2.30)*
Log(Size) 0.03 0.03 0.03 –0.01 0.05
(1.21) (1.20) (1.25) (–0.22) (2.25)*
Unionisation rate  0.05 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.13
(0.69) (0.75) (0.67) (0.55) (0.06)*
Use of computing facilities 0.05
(4.00)*
Share of semi-skilled 
manual workers 0.031 
(0.41)
Share of skilled manual 
workers 0.19 
(1.62)




Share of non-manual foremen/
supervisors  0.04
(0.10)
Share of junior technical/
professional workers 0.22 
(1.79)**
Share of senior technical/
professional workers 0.79 
(4.45)*
Share of middle/senior managers 1.22 
(6.17)*
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 487 487 487 487 487
Robust t-statistics between parentheses. * (**) indicates significant at 5 per cent (10 per cent)
level;. WERS 1990-1998 panel survey; survey (SVYREG) estimation using sample weights
supplied by the WERS panel survey. Dependent variable is log of average gross earnings per
year for full-time employees.
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(column 4). If the technology measure relates to productivity it would provide
evidence that FOEs pay higher wages after controlling for productivity. But
when we control for skill proportions (final column), the foreign-ownership
dummy becomes insignificant, while various skill proportions are significant.
This indicates that FOEs pay more on average partly because they employ a
more skilled workforce. However, we should mention that the WERS cross-
section employee survey 1998 does provide evidence for a wage premium in
foreign owned firms even when controlling for skill level.
VI CONCLUSIONS
We have utilised the 1990-1998 WERS panel data set to examine whether
foreign establishments in Britain pay higher wages than domestic establish-
ments. We find that there is indeed a pay premium of 13 per cent. The pay
premium is strongest for US and Canadian owned establishments and for
establishments that do not experience changes in the (foreign) ownership
structure. However, the pay premium largely disappears when we control for
the skill structure within establishments. Further research should indicate
whether the results are robust to include other pay determinants such as UK-
based multinationals.
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